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Abstract
Motivated by the Covid-19 epidemic, we build a SIR model with private decisions on
social distancing and population heterogeneity in terms of infection-induced fatality
rates, and calibrate it to UK data to understand the quantitative importance of these
assumptions. Compared to our model, the calibrated benchmark version with constant
mean contact rate significantly over-predicts the mean contact rate, the death toll, herd
immunity and prevalence peak. Instead, the calibrated counterfactual version with
endogenous social distancing but no heterogeneity massively under-predicts these
statistics. We use our calibrated model to understand how the impact of mitigating
policies on the epidemic may depend on the responses these policies induce across the
various population segments.We find that policies that shut down some of the essential
sectors have a stronger impact on the death toll than on infections and herd immunity
compared to policies that shut down non-essential sectors. Furthermore, there might
not be an after-wave after policies that shut down some of the essential sectors are
lifted. Restrictions on social distancing can generate welfare gains relative to the case
of no intervention. Milder but longer restrictions on less essential activities might be
better in terms of these welfare gains than stricter but shorter restrictions, whereas
the opposite might be the case for restrictions on more essential activities. Finally,
shutting down some of the more essential sectors might generate larger welfare gains
than shutting down the less essential sectors.
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The current coronavirus epidemic has forcefully brought onto centre stage the need to
understand how social distancing influences the evolution of an epidemic and vice
versa. In the ongoing Covid-19 epidemic, infection-related deaths are more con-
centrated among older individuals and people with certain underlying health issues.
Furthermore, evenwhen facedwith the same government policies on social distancing,
individuals with less serious health consequences from infection seem to take more
risks and social distance themselves less. This suggests that individuals have some
form of discretion regarding their social interactions in the face of the same laws on
social distancing. Motivated by these observations, in this paper we build and quanti-
tatively implement a framework to model the interaction during an epidemic between
private decisions on social distancing and government restrictions on socio-economic
activity that slow the virus transmission, when (a) there is heterogeneity in the popu-
lation regarding the risk of developing a serious illness when infected and eventually
dying, and (b) governments cannot fully control social distancing of individuals.
Under imperfect control of socio-economic activity, individuals of different
mortality-risks may respond differently to “mitigating” policies that restrict social
interactions and economic activity. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, by influ-
encing the evolution of infection, mitigating policies will affect the probability a
susceptible person gets infected and thereby the scope for social distancing. On the
other hand, private decisions on social distancing will naturally also depend, among
others, on personal health conditions and any underlying health risk factors to develop
a serious disease because of an infection.As a result, the impact of imperfectmitigating
policies on the evolution of an epidemic and the welfare of the various risk-groupsmay
actually depend on the responses these policies induce across the various segments
of the population. Existing epidemiological models ignore this because they either
treat social distancing as exogenous to the evolution of the epidemic, or assume that
the government can control socio-economic activity and thereby social distancing.
This paper makes a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature by building a sim-
ple fit-for-purpose variant of the basic SIR model (Kermack and McKendrick 1927;
Anderson et al. 1992)—one of the most commonly used epidemiological models for
the understanding of the current coronavirus epidemic. By doing so, we contribute to
the improvement of our understanding of the welfare implications and impact on the
evolution of an epidemic of imperfect mitigating policies.
Using existing estimates for the basic reproduction number, the length of the infec-
tious period, and the length of the time from the onset of the infection to death,
we calibrate our model to UK data on reported deaths during the current coron-
avirus epidemic to understand the quantitative significance for predictions of our novel
assumption of endogenous social distancing by different mortality-risk groups.1 Com-
pared to our model, the calibrated benchmark version with exogenous and constant
mean contact rate significantly over-predicts the mean contact rate over the duration
of the epidemic, the death toll, exposure and the infection peak. Instead, the calibrated
1 Similar data is available for several other countries and therefore our exercise could be applied to more
countries as well.
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counterfactual version with endogenous social distancing but with no heterogeneity
in mortality rates massively under-predicts these statistics. We also use our calibrated
model to study various hypothetical scenarios of imperfect government intervention
on social distancing, and understand how the effects of various lockdown policies
may depend on the behavioural responses these policies induce across a heterogenous
population. The aim of our exercise is to highlight in the simplest possible manner
how economics techniques could be integrated in epidemiological models to help us
improve our understanding of the course of an epidemic and plan effective control
strategies.
In general, social distancing refers to the adoption of a behaviour by individuals
that reduces their risk of becoming infected. Examples are: limiting contact with
other individuals or reducing the transmission risk during each contact. In our work,
social distancing is modeled as a reduction in the proportion of all possible contacts a
person can have. Social distancing incurs a cost in terms of isolation, distancing and
alienating from friends and family, convenience, productivity, income e.t.c. As a result,
individuals will only adopt (more) social distancing when there is a specific incentive
to do so. Such incentives may include reducing the risk of death or the financial and
health costs a person may face when infected. Typically, there is heterogeneity in the
incentives to exert social distancing; for example, due to different infection-induced
fatality rates across individuals with different health conditions. Our model allows us
to study the different incentives to exert social distancing in the various segments of the
population, and understand how thesemay change over the course of an epidemic. As it
is known from the received literature, social distancing is increasing at the early stages
of infection and decreasing at the later stages of infection. Typically, also, individuals
that are of high risk to develop a serious illness when infected and eventually die will
abstainmore fromsocial interactions than the rest of the population.Ourmodel predicts
that such high-risk individuals will exercise significant social distancing before any
lockdown restrictions are even introduced, which is consistent with recent evidence.2
Our model predicts also that by the date of the first reported death, 0.009% of
the UK population would have already been infected with the virus.3 In addition, the
epidemic wave in the UK would last around six months in the absence of government
intervention. Third, our numerical analysis suggests that the peak of the mortality
rate in UK would have occurred around mid April in the absence of government
intervention, but with a significant death toll by the end of the epidemic.
We also find that the predicted evolution of the epidemic is significantly different
quantitatively when social distancing is endogenous than when the mean contact rate
is constant. Specifically, our simulations suggest that the death toll under endogenous
social distancing is about one third of that under constant social distancing. Moreover,
the mean contact rate over the duration of the epidemic is lower by about 10% com-
pared to the case of constant social distancing. Furthermore, under endogenous social
2 See Maloney and Taskin (2020). For related suggestive evidence based on UK mobility data from
Apple, see https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/coronavirus-lockdown-uk-date-travel-
a9516901.html.
3 The corresponding number in Lourenço et al. (2020), where there is population heterogeneity in infection-




distancing the predicted infection peak is less than half of, and the total exposure to
the infection is a quarter less than, what is predicted under constant social distancing.
Crucially, social distancing decisions produce a positive externality as the higher
the investment in social distancing the lower the rate of infection in the wider pop-
ulation is. Consequently, government intervention will typically be required in order
to induce more social distancing. Motivated by this, our paper contributes also to the
understanding of the impact of government intervention on social distancing and the
epidemic by studying various lockdown episodes in terms of their welfare implica-
tions, their impact on the evolution of infection, exposure and death toll, and whether
they are followed by a major after-wave or not. Importantly, the lockdown policies
we focus on are not of first-best nature. That is, we do not investigate the solution to
the optimal design problem that determines the optimal from the point of view of the
society social distancing. The reason is that, despite its inherent theoretical interest,
a full implementation of the optimal social distancing in large and modern societies
would require massive administrative costs in terms of policing and of fine-tuning
social interactions along several dimensions on a daily basis based on the state of the
epidemic. We, therefore, choose to focus on “second-best” lockdown policies, which
allow for some discretion on the part of individuals regarding social interactions.
Regarding the effects of various second-best government interventions on social
distancing, our results suggest that the length of a lockdown that shuts down non-
essential sectors such as services has a significant effect on the death toll, and the
“flattening of the curve”, but also on the behavioural responses of low-risk individuals
when such policies are lifted. These behavioural responses, in turn, could contribute
to an after-wave. These policies generate welfare gains compared to the case of no
government intervention. Milder but longer restrictions on less essential activities
might generate higher welfare gains than stricter but shorter restrictions.
Furthermore, our numerical analysis indicates that a government intervention
that forces some of the essential sectors such as schools and parts of hospital-
ity/entertainment industry to close down or reduce their operations has a significant
negative impact on the cumulative count of deaths but not on the evolution of infec-
tions and herd immunity. The welfare gains from these intervention policies are large.
Our numerical findings suggest that shutting down some of the more essential sec-
tors generates much larger welfare gains than shutting down the less essential sectors.
Moreover, stricter but shorter restrictions on more essential activities might generate
much higher welfare gains than milder but longer restrictions. Our results suggest also
that restrictions on the more essential sectors might not be followed by a second wave
once these restrictions are lifted. The reason is that such mitigating policies will not
affect social distancing by low-risk susceptible individuals during the lockdown.
To understand the latter finding, observe first that in the SIR model there is no
after-wave when the mean contact rate times the proportion in the population of the
susceptible to infection individuals times the basic reproduction number is (weakly)
lower than one. This condition forms the basis of arguments in favour of strict lock-
downs (a low mean contact rate) or of high herd immunity (a low pool of susceptible
individuals) or of testing-and-tracing (a low basic reproduction number) in order to
avoid a second wave of the infection. However, the mean contact rate is endogenous
and depends on the evolution of the epidemic. Depending on the simulated lockdown
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policies, the equilibrium mean contact rate is roughly between 0.63 and 0.79 during
the intervention period. With a basic reproduction number of 2.25 (used for instance
in Lourenço et al. (2020) this implies that there will be no second wave when the sim-
ulated lockdowns are lifted, if the proportion in the population that has been exposed
to the infection (and are no longer susceptible) is at least equal to around 44%. In
our calibrated model, the equilibrium proportion of exposed people at the instant the
simulated lockdowns are lifted is around 56%, and so there is no after-wave.
Furthermore, we identify a policy mix that consists of shutting some of the less
essential and some of the more essential sectors on the day of the first UK lockdown,
and leads to a similar death toll to the UK one at the time of writing these lines. We
analyse the impact on the evolution of the epidemic, including the after-wave, that
would emerge if this policy mix was lifted six weeks after its introduction. The result
of this policy intervention is a significant flattening of the curve, followed by a sizeable
second wave.
Related Literature: Our paper contributes to the literature that combines epi-
demiological models with equilibrium behavioral choice (for early contributions see
Geoffard and Philipson 1996 and Fenichel 2013).We extend this literature by allowing
for heterogenous mortality-risk groups. Compared to this literature we also discuss
different types of policy interventions that de facto allow some discretion on the part
of individuals regarding social interactions.
SIRmodels have beenused extensively inmathematical epidemiology. Suchmodels
are particularly relevant for the study of the current SARS-CoV-2 epidemic because
they assume that individuals become infectious as soon as they get infected and that
recovered people do not get infectious again, which is a good first approximation of
what is currently agreed by many experts to be the leading hypotheses for Covid-
19. For, instance, it has been used in Lourenço et al. (2020), a study which found
itself in the public spotlight.4 In that paper, there is heterogeneity in infection-induced
fatality rates. In addition, in the spirit of the traditional SIR model, social distancing
is exogenously given. Our model, extends that work by (a) allowing for fatality rates
of individuals who developed severe illness when infected to depend, due to capacity
constraints in critical care provision, on the stock of infected people who become
seriously ill, and (b) bringing private decisions on social distancing and equilibrium
analysis at centre stage. Epidemiological models have also been used recently to
discuss various issues on epidemics from a macroeconomics point of view.5 In all
these papers as well, individuals do not choose their social distancing.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020) and Krueger et al. (2020) instead study a macroeconomic
version of the SIR model, where people choose to consume goods that require less
social contact, and report that such behaviour can lead to a substantial mitigation
of the economic and human costs of the current coronavirus crisis. Closer to our
work is Reluga et al. (2010), and the independent works by Farboodi et al. (2020),
Keppo et al. (2020) and Toxvaerd (2020), who analyse a SIR model with endogenous
4 “Coronavirus may have infected half of UK population—Oxford study”, Financial Times, 24 March
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/5ff6469a-6dd8-11ea-89df-41bea055720b




social distancing.6 In contrast to our work, all these papers feature models with no
heterogeneity in the population with respect to infection-induced mortality rates. Our
work differs also from Reluga et al. (2010) and Toxvaerd (2020) in that they do not
calibrate their models. Keppo et al. (2020) also discuss various lockdown policies, but,
in contrast to our work, they assume that the cost from getting infected is constant over
time. Moreover, in contrast to our work, Reluga et al. (2010) and Toxvaerd (2020) do
not analyse government interventions regarding social distancing.7 Keppo et al. (2020)
and Farboodi et al. (2020) differ also from our work in that they assume that people do
not know if they are infectious. Furthermore,whenFarboodi et al. (2020) calibrate their
model they assume that the mortality rate is constant, while we maintain throughout
that the mortality rate of people who develop a serious illness from infection depends
on the level of infections, thus capturing limited resources for critical care.8
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the next sectionwe develop themodel,
while in Sects. 3 and 4we discuss equilibrium social distancing andwelfare-improving
government intervention on social distancing. In Sect. 5 we calibrate our model to UK
data on reported deaths. There, we compare the predictions of our equilibrium model
with those of a SIR model where social distancing is exogenous and with those of
a SIR model where social distancing is endogenous but there is no heterogeneity in
infection-induced mortality rates. We also study the implications for the evolution of
the epidemic of various government interventions that induce higher social distancing
than the equilibrium one in some parts of the population. Finally we conclude and
point to possible extensions of our model and directions for future research.
2 Themodel
2.1 The standard SIRmodel
We begin by setting up the standard SIR model. Let N be the population size, which
is assumed to be a very large number. We assume that the epidemic is fast relative to
6 Formore related literature, see the excellent discussion in Toxvaerd (2020).Galanis (2020) study in a static
model the potential to use social proximity, and within-group random testing and anonymous notification
of positive cases as a tool to induce social distancing.
7 See, however, Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2017) for a problem of managing an infection in an SIS model
(where recovered can become infected again) with homogenous population and no risk of infection-induced
mortality. Toxvaerd (2019) also study private social distancing and the planner’s problem in a SIS model.
8 Alvarez et al. (2020) calibrate their model of the optimal design of a lockdown within a SIR framework,
in which, however, there is no heterogeneity in mortality rates and the government directly controls the
contact rates in the population. Acemoglou et al. (2020) generalise Alvarez et al. (2020) by introducing
heterogeneity between age groupswith respect to infectiousness, need for critical care,mortality, and contact
rates. They show that optimal policies differentially targeting age groups significantly outperform optimal
uniform policies, and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown policies on the oldest
group. These papers use data on both deaths and reported cases, while we use only data on deaths. The
reason for our choice is that arguably reported cases are less accurate than reported deaths due to the lack
of extensive testing and the existence of heterogeneity in intensity of symptoms that led to many mild cases
going unreported, especially in UK. Moreover, while we focus on the first 14 days of the epidemic (based
on reported deaths) to avoid contamination by mitigation strategies that were implemented after that time,
Alvarez et al. (2020) use observations for the first 25 days after reported cases have been at least 100, and
Acemoglou et al. (2020) use deaths reported on April 11 and cases reported 18 days earlier.
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the demographic process, and so the population size N is treated as constant. We also
assume that individuals become infectious as soon as they get infected, a modeling
assumption which seems to be roughly consistent with existing evidence for COVID-
19. Denote by t0 the instant when the epidemic starts (the “introduction time”).
Let S be the proportion of the population that is susceptible to infection, I the
proportion of the population that is infected and infectious (or “prevalence”), and R
the proportion of the population that are no longer infectious. Denote also with Z the
proportion of the population that have been exposed to the infection and therefore are
no longer available for infection.9 That is,
Z = I + R = 1 − S (1)
Let β be the mean number of infections per unit of time if every person was
susceptible and has been in contact with an infectious person. This is the rate of
transmission of the infection, or the probability of an infection developing from a
match between a susceptible and an infectious person. Denote with σ the rate with
which the typical infectious individual becomes non-infectious. Thus, 1
σ
is the length
of the infectious period (ie. the mean time until recovery or hospitalisation due to
the development of a serious disease) per infectious individual. These two parameters
are exogenous. We therefore have that the “basic reproduction number”, i.e. mean
number of infections directly generated by one case if all individuals were susceptible




R0 measures the maximum reproductive potential for an infectious disease (at the
beginning of the epidemic).
Note that under homogenous mixing of the population, I is the probability with
which a susceptible individual comes in contact with an infectious person. Allowing,
instead, for non-homogenous but random matching, let γ be the proportion of the
infectious population with which a susceptible person comes in contact (or the proba-
bility with which a susceptible person comes in contact with an infectious person). We
will refer to it as the mean contact rate. The two differential equations that determine
S and I are thus:
dS
dt
= −βγ SI (3)
d I
dt
= βγ SI − σ I (4)
9 Evidence so far indicates that for SARS-CoV-2, virtually all individuals who get infected are immune to
future infection by the same strain, which supports our modeling assumption (when it comes to the SARS-
CoV-2 epidemic) that susceptible, infectious and recovered individuals comprise the whole population.
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= βγ SI (5)
with initial value Z(t0) = Z0 = 1 − S0 ∈ (0, 1). In this model, an epidemic with
increasing number of infections initially starts whenR0γ S0 > 1, otherwise infections
drop below their initial level from t0 onwards and vanish over time. We will focus on
themore interesting case where infections increase initially, noting however that in our
model with endogenous social distancing the mean contact rate may be time-varying.
Hereafter, we will refer to βγ S as the rate of infection, βγ SI as the aggregate
rate of infection, and βγ S − σ as the spread of infection. Denote also with I (γ ) the
peak (i.e. the highest level) of the infection given the proportion γ of the infectious
population with which a susceptible person comes in contact. This is equal to10
I (γ ) = 1 − 1
γR0
[1 + log(γR0S0)]
We note here the dependence of the infection peak I (γ ) on γ , which in general will
depend on social distancing decisions. Therefore, the peak of prevalencewill in general
be different under endogenous social distancing decisions.
2.2 The SIRmodel with heterogeneity in infection-inducedmortality rates
The SIRmodel can also be extended to incorporate heterogeneity in infection-induced
mortality rates at the population. Following Lourenço et al. (2020), we assume that
there are two types of individuals. There are those who belong to a “high-risk” group
(e.g. old people and people with asthma and other respiratory conditions e.t.c.), for
whom getting infected leads with probability θ to a critical, and ultimately fatal,
illness. We refer to these individuals as the high-risk individuals. Let ψ denote the
exogenously given delay between the time of infection and the time of death for a
high-risk person who develops a critical illness from infection.11 The number of the
high-risk individuals is a proportion ρ of the population. The rest of the population,
hereafter referred to as the low-risk individuals, will not die when infected. We will
indicate risk-types with the index i = L, H , where L stands for the low-risk and H
10 In the standard SIR model we have that St = S0e−
βγ
σ (S0+I0−St−It ). The infection peak occurs when
St = σβγ . using this in the previous equation together with S0 + I0 = 1 and the definition ofR0 gives the
condition for I (γ ).
11 An alternative modeling choice would be to assume that high-risk individuals who develop a critical
illness from infection die at a constant rate. We have, however, chosen to maintain the above modeling
assumption in Lourenço et al. (2020) of an exogenous delay between the time of infection and the time of
death to facilitate comparability and highlight the implications of introducing endogenous social distancing
in an established epidemiological model for the understanding of the Covid-19 crisis.
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for the high-risk type.12 Denote the cumulative count of deceased ψ periods ahead as
a proportion of the population by .
We extend the model in Lourenço et al. (2020) in two ways. First, by assuming
that the mortality rate θ is increasing with the share in the population of the infectious
individuals who become seriously ill when infected, i.e.
θ = F(ρ I )
where F : [0, 1] → (0, 1) is a (weakly) increasing function such that F(0) ∈ (0, 1).
This assumption captures an environment where resources for effective critical health
care are limited and thereby health services get stretched (and even overwhelmed)
when the demands for intensive care are high.13 We also assume that F is convex
for low levels of ρ I to capture capacity constraints (such as a limited number of
ICUs) in a smooth way.14 This assumption is plausible in the context of the ongoing
coronavirus epidemic, and therefore important for the quality of the predictions of the
calibrated model. This assumption implies also that the cost of high-risk susceptible
individuals becoming infected is more increasing in the number of infected people
than the corresponding cost of low-risk individuals. This will be an additional source
of heterogeneity in the social distancing decisions of individuals and thereby in the
impact of imperfect mitigating policies on the different segments of the population.
We further extend the model in Lourenço et al. (2020) by allowing for different
probabilities of coming in contact with an infectious person for high-risk and for low-
risk individuals. Denote with ni the probability with which a susceptible person of
risk-type i = L, H comes in contact with an infectious person. We then have that
d
dt
= F(ρ I )ρnHβSI (6)
with(t0) = F(ρ I0)ρ I0. To understand this law-of-motion, we note that ρβSI repre-
sents the new infections (as a proportion of the population) in the current instant among
the high-risk susceptible individuals, had this type of individuals been in contact with
all the infectious people in the population. However, high-risk susceptible individuals
come in contact with other people at a rate nH . Therefore, the proportion of infected
high-risk individuals in the population is ρnHβSI , and hence F(ρ I )ρnHβSI is the
increase in deaths (as a proportion of the population) in ψ periods ahead, all coming
from the part of the susceptible population which is of high risk. Note that when every
individual meets with everyone else (as in Lourenço et al. 2020), we have that nH = 1
12 Evidence so far indicates that for SARS-CoV-2, the vast majority of infected individuals who die have
had underlying health problems that were exacerbated due to the infection, and so our assumption that
low-risk individuals do not die due to the infection seems to be a good modeling approximation of the
SARS-CoV-2 epidemic.
13 Therefore, our model can also be used to study government interventions whereby more resources are
channelled to health care services and as a result F(.) decreases for any given ρ I . However, as our focus is
on social distancing, we leave such an analysis for another paper.
14 See, for instance, Kaplan et al. (2020) and Glover et al. (2020) for alternative ways to introduce capacity
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Fig. 1 States and Flows in the SIR model with heterogenous infection-induced mortality rates
and γ = 1. Here, however, due to endogenous social distancing, we may have that in
equilibrium nH < 1 and, thereby, γ < 1. We return to this shortly.
In this version of the SIRmodel (see Fig. 1), the pool S includes all the (1−ρ)S low-
risk susceptible individuals (SL ) and all the ρS high-risk susceptible individuals (SH );
the pool I includes all the (1− ρ)I low-risk individuals (I L ) who become infectious
(at a rate nLβ), all the (1−θ)ρ I high-risk individuals who become infectious (at a rate
(1−θ)nHβ) but survive the infection (I H ), aswell as the θρ I high-risk individualswho
become infectious (at a rate θnHβ) but become terminally ill and die inψ periods (I ).
Moreover, the pool R includes all the (1−ρ)R low-risk individuals (RL ) who recover
(at a rate σ ), the (1− θ)ρR high-risk individuals (RH ) who survive the infection and
recover (at a rate σ ) as well as the θρR high-risk individuals who become terminally
ill and die in ψ periods but become non-infectious (at a rate σ ) due to hospitalisation
(R). All the high risk-individuals who became infected and will die in ψ periods are
in the pool  = I + R , whether they are infectious or not. More details on this
version of the SIR model are given in the “Appendix”.
The abovemodel could be extended in a number of ways to allow for further hetero-
geneity in the population. For instance there could be heterogeneity in the transmission
rates based on the risk type, or in the recovery rates based on the risk type and whether
an individual has developed a critical illness.15 There could also be heterogeneity
within the group of high-risk individuals regarding the delay from the time of the
onset of the critical illness to the time of death. We choose to abstain from such het-
erogeneities for two reasons. First, there is not enough evidence on the degree of such
heterogeneities that we can use to guide our modeling assumptions and associated cal-
ibration. Therefore, we choose to be agnostic on such heterogeneities and focus only
on the heterogeneity with respect to infection-induced mortality as in Lourenço et al.
(2020). Second, we want to focus on understanding how the novel economic part of
our model – endogenous social distancing by different mortality-risk groups – affects
the predictions of the SIR model and its related variants, and so we choose to keep the
15 See Acemoglou et al. (2020) for a model with such heterogeneity, but where individuals do not choose
their own social distancing.
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details of the epidemiological model as simple as possible to facilitate comparability.
Introducing more heterogeneity would be interesting from a theoretical point of view
and might also improve the overall predictive power of the model, but would not allow
us to highlight the added value of our contribution in a clear and stark manner.
We leave this section by defining the “effective reproduction number” as γ ×R0×S.
This is the number of infections produced by an infectious person. Recalling (4) and
using the definition ofR0, we note that if the effective reproduction number is greater
than one, then infections will grow given the prevailing herd immunity, 1 − S. As
infections grow, the pool of susceptible individuals becomes smaller, the effective
reproduction number eventually drops below one and infections start decreasing, van-
ishing towards the end of the epidemic.
2.3 Incorporating social distancing in the SIRmodel
In our model, we also allow for endogenous social distancing. Each individual is
assumed to be a recipient of a flow utility which depends on her/his risk-type and the
state she/he is at. The states are Susceptible, Infected and Recovered. The expected
utility also depends on the probability of getting infected, which, in turn, depends on
own social distancing choices, the social distancing choices of the rest of the population
and prevalence.
Given any state, the flowutilities are (weakly) higher for low-risk individuals. Given
any risk type, the flow utility in the Susceptible state is (weakly) higher than the flow
utility in the Recovered state, and the flow utility in the latter state is (weakly) higher
than the flow utility in the Infected state. We assume that risk- and state-dependent
flow utilities are constant.16 The transition rate between the Susceptible state and the
Infected state for any individual is equal to βS times the individual’s contact rate. The
latter is (partly) controlled by the given individual.
Specifically, every individual pays a cost associated with social distancing in
exchange for a reduction in their own risk of becoming infected. We restrict attention
to pure strategies. Each individual is very small relative to the rest of the population.
Therefore, each individual takes the levels of infection and susceptibility, S and I ,
and their evolution, to be exogenously given and out of their control. Individuals take
also as given and outside their control the mean contact rate in the population. In
equilibrium, the anticipated (state-dependent) mean contact rate in the population is
equal to the actual mean contact rate implied by individuals’ equilibrium decisions.
16 In principle, the flow economic costs faced by infected individuals may not be time-invariant. This
would, for instance, be the case in the presence of imperfect capital markets. For our paper, we implicitly
assume that there are no capital market imperfections. We also assume that the economy is at a steady state
when it is hit by the epidemic, and that the proportion of the government budget devoted to the support of
the economy during adverse environmental/health aggregate shocks is sufficient for insulating the economy
from anymedium- and long-run consequences of such shocks. Assuming that the epidemic is fast relative to
the evolution of the economy allows us then to treat the income earned and consumption under each state as
constant over the duration of the epidemic. As a result, the flow utilities can be treated as constant over time.
An interesting extension of our model, which we leave for future work, would be to study the implications
for social distancing, and hence the evolution of the epidemic, of various capital market imperfections and
limitations in the ability of governments to borrow/tax to insulate the economy.
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Following the existing literature, we assume that any societal motivation for social
distancing is small relative to the marginal cost of exercising social distancing. A
direct implication of this assumption is that infectious individuals do not exercise
social distancing, and thus the burden of social distancing falls with the non-exposed
individuals. Given this assumption, and in order to simplify notation, we assume
hereafter that there is no societal motivation for social distancing. We also assume
that the instance of becoming infectious coincides with the onset of symptoms. As
a result, no infectious individual mistakenly behaves like a non-exposed one. While
recognising that both these assumptionsmay be restrictive,17 we also note that relaxing
them might reduce further the equilibrium rate of infection and make it potentially
more responsive to second-best lockdown policies.18 Therefore, despite the fact that
relaxing these two assumptions might potentially generate new insights in addition to
those our paper produces, the main message of our work might even be strengthened
after relaxing these two assumptions. We leave such an extension for future work.
We also assume that individuals know their risk type (i.e. whether they are old or
have underlying respiratory problems). In reality, there can be caseswhere somepeople
do not knowwhether they are of low- or high-risk type.19 However, we conjecture that
this type of individuals will only be a very small percentage in the population, with
most people having a strong indication of whether they have an underlying condition
that would classify them as high-risk types in our model’s lingo. Therefore, ignoring
this group of individuals might not be with much loss of generality.
Except their risk-type, individuals are ex ante identical to each other in any other
aspect. We thus focus on pure-strategy equilibria where all susceptible individuals of
the same risk-type choose the same pure-strategy social distancing.
We formulate the social distancing problem of each non-exposed (i.e. being at
the Susceptible state) individual as one where she/he chooses (through altering
socio-economic behaviour) the probability with which she/he severs a contact (or,
17 Similar assumptions are used in Reluga (2010) and Toxvaerd (2020).
18 An individual who is infectious but has no symptoms yet may attach a positive probability on them
being susceptible. As a result, they may also adopt some social distancing, which, in turn, will reduce the
probability a susceptible person will come in contact with an infectious person, all other things equal. A
sufficiently high societal motive on the part of infectious individuals will induce them to adopt some social
distancing, which, in turn, will also reduce the probability a susceptible person will come in contact with an
infectious person, all other things equal. Both these effects operate towards reducing the equilibrium rate
of infection. However, other things may not stay the same. The reason is that non-infectious individuals
might adopt a lower level of social distancing because (a) a lower probability with which they will come in
contact with an infectious person (due to infectious individuals exercising some social distancing) implies
a lower risk of getting infected, and (b) susceptible individuals may attach a positive probability on them
already being infected but without symptoms and thereby exercise less social distancing compared to the
casewhen the instance of becoming infectious coincideswith the onset of symptoms. Therefore, whether the
equilibrium rate of infection is lower or not as a result of allowing for societalmotive and for pre-symptomatic
infection will eventually depend on the relative strength of the direct effect on infectious individuals’ social
distancing and the indirect—equilibrium—effect on susceptible individuals’ social distancing. If the direct
effect is stronger, then the net effect of introducing a societal motive or pre-symptomatic infection will be
to reduce the equilibrium rate of infection.
19 Uncertainty over own risk type would make susceptible individuals exerting more social distancing than
the low-risk individuals in our model, but less social distancing than the high-risk individuals in our model.
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equivalently, the proportion of all the contacts she/he severs).20 We denote by δi the
percentage of potential contacts a susceptible individual of risk type i = L, H , severs
by exercising social distancing. That is, the contact rate of individuals of risk type i is
equal to ni = 1 − δi .
We postulate that the costs of reducing more essential socio-economic activities
are higher than the costs of reducing less essential socio-economic activities. As a
result, when an individual wants to increase their socially distancing, they will do
so by reducing first the least essential socio-economic activities from the available
activities. This assumption implies an environment where, starting from two different
degrees of social distancing, a small increase in social distancing is associated with
reducing more essential social interactions and economic activities in the higher of
the two starting degrees of social distancing; that is, an environment with convex costs
from social distancing. To simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to quadratic
costs.21
We also postulate that social distancingmay face exogenous bounds 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ ≤ 1.
For instance, δ > 0 can capture a government intervention that enforces a minimum
level of distancing such as a curfew. δ < 1, on the other hand, may be the case
because people may need to interact with other people from their network for essential
shopping, getting help, catering for their pets or other family members in need etc.
Related, some people may have to go to work either because they are essential workers
or because they face pressure from employers. The latter raises another avenue for
government intervention towards enabling more social distancing. We will refer to δ
as the minimal (degree of) social distancing, and to δ as the maximal (degree of) social
distancing.
LetV iI be the (expected) net present value (NPV) of being infectious and of risk-type
i = L, H but surviving the infection (which happens with probability one for low-risk
individuals and probability 1−F(ρ I ) for high-risk individuals.) Given our assumption
that flow utilities are constant, and that the Recovered state is an absorbing state, this
NPV is also constant. Let also V iS be the NPV of being susceptible to infection and of
risk-type i = L, H . Denote with Ki the expected net present value of the welfare cost
of susceptible individuals of risk-type i = L, H , from getting infected and surviving
20 For an investment towards social distancing c, we have that only d(c) proportion of feasible contacts
survive, where d(c) is a decreasing and (weakly) convex function (see also Reluga et al. 2010). Denoting
with δ, the proportion of feasible contacts a person severs, and setting 1− δ = d(c) allows us to define the
cost of inducing a reduction δ in the probability of a contact taking place as d−1(1 − δ). For instance, if
d(c) = 11+mc ,m > 0, then the cost of inducing a reduction equal to δ is m−1 δ1−δ . If, as another example,
d(c) = 1 − √2mc,m > 0, then the cost of inducing a reduction equal to δ is m−1 δ22 . As a final example,
if d(c) = 1 − cm ,m > 0, then the cost of inducing a reduction equal to δ is mδ.
21 An alternative assumption that has appeared in the literature is that of a constant marginal cost from
social distancing, which presumes uniform costs from social distancing across all activities. Under such an
assumption private social distancing takes the form of a step function. To be more precise, if the expected
health cost (given current infectiousness) under no social distancing is below the constant marginal cost
from exercising social distancing, then private social distancing is equal to its lowest feasible level, while if
the expected health cost under no social distancing is above the constantmarginal cost from exercising social





Ki = V iS − V iI
We assume hereafter that the difference between the flow utilities of low-risk people
and the flow utilities of high-risk individuals under the Infected and under the Recov-
ered state are high enough so that KH > KL . In addition to the cost from getting
infected but surviving the infection, high-risk individuals face also an additional cost
from becoming critically ill and eventually dying (ψ periods ahead), denoted by K
in present value terms, and assumed to be positive. We show in the “Appendix” that,
given our assumptions, this cost is constant. We assume that the cost from dying, K ,
is finite.22 Finally, denote with Ci the expected net present value of the welfare cost




CH = KH + F(ρ I )K








where ξ denotes the discount rate, and φi is a constant which depends on the discount
rate, the recovery rate, and the flow utilities for an individual of risk-type i = L, H ,
when susceptible, when infectious but surviving the infection, and when recovered.
The above law-of-motion is, in effect, the formula that gives the equilibrium NPV
from being at the Susceptible state of an individual of risk-type i = L, H , V iS , after
using that Ki = V iS − V iI and rearranging (see the “Appendix” for more details.)
We show in the “Appendix” that every non-exposed individual of risk-type i =
L, H , solves, in effect, the following problem:
max
δi∈[δ,δ]




where we note that δiβ I is the reduction in the probability of getting infected in the
next instant given current social distancing δi . All individuals take β ICi to be outside
their control. Note thus that the optimal social distancing of an individual of risk-type
22 For a recent treatment of the economic cost of death see Kniesner and Viscusi (2020). For a collection of
estimates of the economic value of life used in various cost-benefit policy studies see https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Value_of_life.
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i = L, H , minimises the right-hand size of the above law-of-motion (7), i.e. the rate
of increase of the cost from getting infected but surviving the infection.
It follows that in equilibrium every susceptible low-risk individual chooses social
distancing
δL = δ∗L(KL , I ) ≡ max{δ,min{β I KL , δ}} (8)
To understand this note that δL is the marginal cost and β I KL is the marginal benefit
from social distancing. The marginal benefit and, thereby, the chosen social distancing
by low-risk individuals is, as intuition would suggest, increasing in the infection rate
β I and the cost of getting infected, KL .
In turn, in equilibrium, every susceptible high-risk individual chooses social dis-
tancing
δH = δ∗H (KH , I ) ≡ max{δ,min{β I [KH + F(ρ I )K ], δ}} (9)
for any given level of infection I . To understand this recall that δH is the marginal
cost and note that β I [KH + F(ρ I )K ] is the marginal benefit from social distancing.
The marginal benefit and, thereby, the social distancing by high-risk individuals is, as
intuition would suggest, increasing in the transmission rate β, prevalence I , the cost
of getting infected but surviving the infection KH , and the cost of dying K . Observe
that
δ∗H (KH , I ) ≥ δ∗L(KL , I )
due to F(ρ I ) ≥ F(0) > 0, KH > KL and K > 0.
Furthermore, we have that in equilibrium:
ni = 1 − δ∗i (Ki , I )
for any i = L, H , and
γ = γ (KL , KH , I ) ≡ (1 − ρ)
(
1 − δ∗L(KL , I )
) + ρ(1 − δ∗H (KH , I ))
Clearly, then, the evolution of the equilibrium social distancing will depend on the
evolution of the epidemic as well as the evolution of the costs from getting infected
and surviving the infection Ki .
Before we leave this section, we note that the above decision problem could poten-
tially be extended in several ways. For instance, there could be heterogeneity with
respect to the cost of social distancing; high-risk individuals might face a lower cost
of social distancing if they are retired or are under care. Such a model would lead to
even lower social distancing for the group with the higher cost from social distancing
compared to the group with the lower cost from social distancing. There could also be
heterogeneity in terms of the maximal social distancing people can exercise; high-risk
individuals might face a higher upper bound because they may not work anyway or
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because they have arranged care. Such amodel could lead to even higher social distanc-
ing on the part of high-risk individuals.23 Moreover, observe that the above problem
would also describe individual decision-making in a population where people do not
know their risk type, but the population consists of two groups with different beliefs
about the likelihood that they are of high or low risk. In such a model, the subscript i
would indicate the group in terms of these beliefs and Ci would also take into account
the uncertainty from the point of view of individuals about their risk type. We choose
to abstain from such very interesting and plausible types of (additional) heterogeneity,
as well as from other possible extensions (see the Conclusions), because we want to
focus on understanding how the novel part of our model affects the predictions of the
SIR model and its related variants. Therefore, we choose to keep the details of the
economic part of our model as simple as possible in order to facilitate comparability,
and emphasise our contribution in a clear and focused manner. By doing so, we hope
to make the case for the scope of future research that constructs even more elaborate
models with potentially higher predictive power.
3 The equilibrium SIRmodel
In equilibrium, the two differential equations above that determine Z and I become:
dZ
dt
= [(1 − ρ) (1 − δ∗L(KL , I )
) + ρ(1 − δ∗H (KH , I )
]
β(1 − Z)I (10)
d I
dt
= {[(1−ρ) (1 − δ∗L(KL , I )
)+ρ(1−δ∗H (KH , I ))
]
β(1 − Z)−σ} I (11)
with initial values Z(t0) = I0 and I (t0) = I0 ∈ (0, 1).
In addition, we have that the law-of-motion for the cumulative number of deaths at
time t + ψ is equal to
d
dt
= F(ρ I )ρ(1 − δ∗H (KH , I ))β(1 − Z)I (12)
with initial value
(t0) = F(ρ I0)ρ I0
This law-of-motionwill be used for the calibration of ourmodel toUKdata on reported
deaths.
Finally, the laws-of-motion above that govern the evolution over time of the costs
from getting infected but surviving the infection for the low- and high-risk individuals
23 Such a model would also allow the study of “targeted” second-best lockdown policies such as those
restricting socio-economic activities of high-risk individuals only. See Acemoglou et al. (2020) for a study
of targeted first-best lockdown policies, i.e. under the assumption that the planner can control directly the
social distancing of different groups.
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= φL + ξKL + [1 − δ∗L(KL , I )]β I KL +






= φH + ξKH + [1 − δ∗H (KH , I )]β I [KH + F(ρ I )K ] +




respectively. Let Ki0, i = L, H , denote the initial costs from getting infected and
surviving the infection. These are endogenously determined to ensure convergence to
a steady state.
Note that, with δ = 0, I0 > 0 and S0 > 1γ (KL0,KH0,I0)R0 , in any steady state with
zero prevalence and with finite costs from being infected and surviving the infection,
denoted by K ∗L and K ∗H , we have zero social distancing from all individuals. Con-
sequently, in any such steady state, we have K ∗i = −φ
i
ξ
for all i = L, H . In such
equilibrium, the pool of infected increases over time until it reaches an endogenously
determined peak at which time the number of exposed individuals is high enough for
the spread of infection to become negative and infections start decreasing all the way
to zero. Interestingly, we note that infections will peak quicker than in the absence of
social distancing as now an increase in infections raises social distancing as well (at
least initially) reinforcing the standard effect on the rate of infection of a lower pool
of susceptible people. Similarly when δ > 0; the only difference in this case is that
the steady-state values of the costs from getting infected but surviving the infections
are appropriately modified to ensure that ∂Ki
∂t = 0 for all i = L, H .
Unfortunately, deriving an analytic solution for the system of highly non-linear
ODEs (10)-(14) is very difficult and we have to resort to numerical solutions. These
solutions will depend on the parameter choices. Existing estimates and the calibration
of our model to data on reported coronavirus-related deaths in UK will guide our
selection of the model parameters. Before we do so in Sect. 5, we discuss next various
scenarios of government intervention.
4 Government intervention
Private decisions on social distancing produce an externality due to the fact that indi-
viduals do not internalise that their social distancing decisions have an effect on the
mean contact rate and thereby on the evolution of the epidemic over time. Therefore,
individuals do not take into account that an increase in their social distancing reduces
the future risk of infections and future probability of death faced by other individuals.
This externality is positive, and will be the dominant one if the cost from dying K is
sufficiently high. In such an environment, the optimal (from the point of view of a Util-
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itarian planner) social distancing is (weakly) higher than that chosen by susceptible
individuals themselves. See the “Appendix” for the details.
Importantly, despite its inherent theoretical interest, a full implementation of the
optimal social distancing in large and modern societies would require massive admin-
istrative costs in terms of policing and fine-tuning social interactions along several
dimensions on a daily basis. In fact, anecdotal evidence and news items during the
current coronavirus crisis suggest that, even when faced with the same government
policies on social distancing, low-risk individuals seem to take more risks and social
distance themselves less. This suggests that individuals have some discretion regarding
their social interactions in the face of the same laws on social distancing. We, there-
fore, choose to focus hereafter on “second-best” lockdown policies and their effects
on the evolution of the epidemic. There are potentially several ways to model second-
best lockdown policies, depending on the specific assumptions about the enforcement
of social distancing restrictions. In this paper, we will focus only on a few of these
modeling options.
Despite its inability to fine-tune social distancing along several dimensions on a
daily basis given the state of the epidemic, the government can still impose certain
restrictions on socio-economic activities. For example, it can shut down less essential
sectors, or limit their operations, impose a curfew or restrict large gatherings. In terms
of our model, such policies will force individuals to refrain from the less essential
activities. Given our interpretation of higher degrees of social distancing as refraining
from more essential activities, such policies can thus be captured in our model by an
increase in the minimal degree of social distancing δ.
Governments can also introduce strict social distancing restrictions in some of the
essential sectors such as schools, universities, government buildings and agencies.
They can also provide food delivery and in-house care to high-risk individuals.24 In
terms of our model, such policies will enable individuals to refrain from some of the
more essential activities.Given our interpretation of higher degrees of social distancing
as staying away from more essential activities, such policies can thus be captured in
our model by an increase in the maximal degree of social distancing δ.
At this stage, the following remarks are in order.
4.1 Two remarks on themodeling of second-best policies
Some readers may argue that the way policy is modeled in the paper seems to depend
significantly on what cost function is employed. We note that this is not the case
insofar one restricts attention to convex cost functions, as we do here. The reason is the
following. A linear cost function leads always to corner solutions, which might make
it not the best modeling choice, especially if one wants to describe what we observe
in reality, where we see many people taking risks with some people taking more risks
than others. On the other hand, a convex cost function (including the quadratic one we
use here) does allow for interior solutions in principle: interior social distancing will
take place as long as themarginal benefit is in some appropriately defined intermediate
24 In reality, the costs of such provisions may be covered through higher current public debt and higher
taxation in the future. In our model, these costs are encompassed by the social-distancing cost function.
123
Covid and social distancing with a heterogenous population
range. Importantly, thus, it is the boundary conditions on social distancing that are in
operation when it comes to forcing corner solutions: the minimal degree of social
distancing (δ ≥ 0 in our model, δ = 0 in other models in the literature) for low-risk
individuals, and the maximal degree of social distancing (δ ≤ 1 in our model, δ = 1
in other models in the literature) for high-risk individuals. In fact, such boundary
constraints, set at the appropriate level, would force corner solutions for any convex
cost function. At this stage some readers may argue that relatively small changes
in the boundaries δ and δ would not affect agents’ behavior. Would we then just
say these agents are not responsive to policy? True, small changes of the boundary
constraints will not change interior behaviour, but large changes will, and policies as
conceptualized in this paper could induce large changes in the boundary degrees of
social distancing: some extreme examples are a strict curfew, or shutting down the
whole economy except hospitals.
Given the justification in Sect. 2.3 on the use of a convex cost function, thinking
about alternative ways of modeling second-best policy stumbles on the issue of costly
design and enforceability. The reason is that any attempt to affect interior social dis-
tancing decisions in ways different than those envisaged here (such as stay-at-home a
certain level or percentage more than what would have been the case without govern-
ment intervention) would also require high design and implementation costs. To be
consistent with the narrative of the paper on enforceability of policies, we therefore
chose to not discuss other (more demanding in terms of enforcement) policies.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the qualitative effects of the policies
we focus on.
4.2 Reducingmore essential activities
High-risk individuals may face a high probability of dying after getting infected,
with this probability being increasing with infections due to capacity constraints in
critical care provision. As a result, high-risk individuals are more likely than low-
risk individuals to choose the maximal level of social distancing, severing all but
essential contacts. Thus, one way with which the government could intervene and
reduce deaths would be to shut down some of the essential sectors of the economy or
reduce their operations, thereby allowing high-risk individuals to insulate themselves
more. An example of this is the government providing the option of in-house medical
care/support and groceries delivered at home, with the costs ultimately passed on to
individuals (through a direct charge or future taxation). In our model, this can be
captured by an exogenous increase in maximal social distancing δ.
An increase in maximal social distancing δ is more likely to decrease (at the later
stages of the epidemic) the rate of infection among the high-risk individuals, ρ(1 −
(δ∗H (KH , I ))β(1 − Z), for any given infection capacity β(1 − Z), than the rate of
infection among the low-risk individuals. This has a number of implications. First,
the decrease in the rate of infection among high-risk individuals reduces the number
of future deaths (recall (12)). This reduction comes both through a direct reduction
in the infection rate among high-risk individuals (for given fatality rate) and through
a reduction in the future mortality rates (for given future infection rates among high-
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risk individuals). These effects emphasise the importance of government interventions
that increase social distancing from high-risk people in terms of reducing the count of
fatalities. Second, the decrease in the rate of infection due to an increase in δ reduces
the flow of infection d Idt , but it also reduces the flow of exposure to the infection
dZ
dt
and thereby the dampening effects of new infections on the future flow of infections
(i.e. the 1− Z term in (11) after recalling (10)). Therefore, increasing social distancing
from high-risk individuals has an ambiguous effect on the duration of the infection,
with the net effect depending on the primitive factors of the infection such as the
relative sizes of ρ, β and σ .
4.3 Restricting less essential activities
Shutting down or reducing the operations of the less essential sectors of the economy
such as restaurants, banning large gatherings, or imposing a curfew is more likely to
increase social distancing of low-risk individuals than social distancing of high-risk
individuals. Thus, one way with which the government could intervene and increase
social distancing in the early stages of the epidemic would be to restrict the least
essential activities. In our model, this can be captured by an exogenous increase in
minimal social distancing δ.
An increase in minimal social distancing δ is more likely to decrease (at the early
stages of the epidemic) the rate of infection among low-risk individuals, (1− ρ)(1−
(δ∗L(KL , I ))β, than the rate of infection of high-risk individuals.25 This has a number
of consequences. First, it reduces the number of future deaths. This reduction comes
indirectly through the lowering of themean contact rate and thereby the relief of health
services and the associated reduction in themortality rates among high-risk individuals
in the future. This novel effect highlights the significance of government interventions
that increase social distancing of low-risk individuals in terms of reducing the count
of fatalities. Second, the decrease in the rate of infection due to the increase in social
distancing of low-risk individuals reduces the flow of infection d Idt , but it also reduces
the flow of exposure to the infection dZdt and thereby the dampening effects of new
infections on the future flow of infections. Therefore, increasing social distancing of
low-risk individuals also has an ambiguous effect on the duration of the infection, with
the net effect depending on the primitive factors of the infection such as the relative
sizes of ρ, β and σ .
An important issue in all these partial lockdown scenarios is whether there will be
an after-wave once the lockdown policies are lifted. The effective reproduction number
at the time lockdowns are lifted tells us whether there will be a second wave or not.
Specifically, denoting with τ the time of lifting the lockdown policies, we have that a
second wave will emerge if and only if the effective reproduction number at time τ is
higher than one, i.e. γ (KLτ , KHτ , Iτ )SτR0 > 1.
25 If the government can enforce theminimal degree of social distancing to every individual, then infectious
people will also be forced to exercise the minimal degree of social distancing. In this case, the rates of
infection need to be multiplied by (1− δ) as only (1− δ) proportion of the infectious people may come in
contact with susceptible individuals.
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5 Quantitative analysis
We calibrate the our model to daily UK data on reported deaths from the Covid-
19 epidemic, using also existing estimates of epidemiological model parameters that
represent the basic reproduction number, the length of the infectious period, and the
length of the time from the onset of the infection to death.
Specifically, we set the daily discount rate at ξ = 0.05/365 to be consistent with
a 5% annual interest rate, and N = 66.87M . In the basic calibration, we use the
following estimates: R0 = 2.25, 1/σ = 4.5, ψ = 17.26 We also use β = R0σ . We
set the introduction date to be t0 = τ1 − ψ , where τ1 is the date in the data when the
first death was reported.27 Furthermore, we postulate that
F(w) = min{θ1−kw0 , p}, θ0 ≤ p ≤ 1
Observe that this formulation incorporates the special case of a constant mortality rate
when k = 0. Instead, when k > 0, the mortality rate is an increasing and initially
convex function of w. Under this formulation, a low (but positive) k captures (in a
smooth way) a capacity constraint (in critical care) that becomes an issue only for
high w′s, while a high k would capture a capacity constraint that binds early in the
epidemic.Aswewill see below, the calibrated value for k turns out to be large justifying
our approach to endogenise the mortality rate of the high-risk individuals in the SIR
model with heterogeneity in the infection-induced mortality rates used in Lourenço
et al. (2020).
In addition, we set δ = 0.7, so that 1 − δ is roughly equal to the share of GDP of
essential sectors such as health, government, retail, utilities, and food manufacturing,
which continue to operate even in extreme scenarios (see also Alvarez et al. 2020).
We also set δ = 0 to capture an environment without intervention.
We assume logarithmic utility (i.e. CRRA parameter equal to one) and normalise
units by setting the flow utility of all susceptible people to be equal to zero, regardless
of their risk type. Therefore, the benchmark consumption of all susceptible individuals
in our model is normalised to one, and hence all model units are measured in daily
26 Kucharski et al. (2020) report a median estimate ofR0 = 2.35 andWu et al. (2020) report an estimate of
R0 = 2.2. Given these estimates, we will also check how our calibration results change when R0 = 2.22
andR0 = 2.28. Lourenço et al. (2020) report and use an estimate of ψ = 17, stating that this estimate for
ψ includes the incubation period as well. Linton et al. (2020), report that the mean time to death from the
onset of disease is 15 and the mean incubation period is 5.3. (see their Table 1). Given these estimates, we
will also derive calibration results for the cases ψ = 15 and ψ = 20. Lourenço et al. (2020) also report and
use an estimate of 1/σ = 4.5. We will also conduct sensitivity analysis by using σ = 0.18 and σ = 0.205.
27 To be more precise, the introduction date thus found is 18/2/2020. There were only 9 reported cases
during the 18 days prior to the introduction date and no newly reported cases on the introduction date.
From these 9 reported cases, the first 2 were on 31/1/2020, the next one on 7/2/2020, with 5 more on 10/2.
The last reported case prior to the introduction date was on 12/2/2020 and no other case was reported until
24/2/2020. Of course, most probably not all cases were reported as symptoms can be similar to flu, which
motivated our focus on deaths for the calibration of our model. Moreover, in reality there is heterogeneity in
the time of delay from the onset of illness to death and in the incubation period. In fact, Linton et al. (2020),
find that the time of delay from the onset of illness to death follows a lognormal distribution with mean 15
and standard deviation 6.9, while the incubation period follows a lognormal distribution with mean 5.3 and
standard deviation 3.2, Taking into account of such heterogeneity is left for future work.
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Table 1 Calibration: Exogenous parameters
Definition Symbol Value
CRRA parameter – 1
Recovery rate σ 1/4.5
Infection rate β 0.5
Mean length between onset and death ψ 17
Annual interest rate r 5%
Daily discount rate ξ r/365
Population N 66.87M
Percentage of Essential Sectors (1 − δ) × 100 30%
Economic cost of death K 108
consumption per capita terms.We also set K = 108 which is consistent with a statisti-
cal value of life of 127.5 times the annual consumption per capita. Table 1 summarises
the set parameters. To see how a statistical value of life of 127.5 times the annual con-
sumption per capita implies K = 108, let, first, P be the extra cost of dying in terms of
current annual consumption per capita. We identify a statistical value of life SVL with
the shadow cost of dying (in the absence of an epidemic), which consists of the NPV
of one unit of annual per capita consumption (with r annual discount rate) plus the
extra cost of dying P , i.e. equal to 1r + P . With SV L = 127.5 and r = 0.05, we have
P = 107.5. Next, note that a cost P is equivalent to paying daily a constant stream of
ξ P . Given that K is the NPV of the extra cost of dying (in ψ periods) in utility terms,





Using P = 107.5 and ξ = 0.05/365 gives K = 108. Observe now that a statistical
value of life of 127.5 times the annual consumption per capita is equal to the average
of the value of 30 times the annual consumption per capita found by Hall et al. (2020)
and used in Alvarez et al. (2020) and the value of 225 times the annual consumption
per capita found by Kniesner and Viscusi (2020).28
Finally, we calibrate the remaining parameters by minimising the squared sum
of the residuals (expressed in proportional terms) between cumulative deaths in our
model, implied by (12), and those in UK data.29
28 Farboodi et al. (2020) uses, in terms of our notation, ξ P = 0.011 and thereby K = 80. Estimates
of the statistical value of life are typically attained under the assumptions of no epidemic and a constant
mortality rate. In our model, however, we have an endogenous probability of dying (after ψ periods) which
depends on the level of infection. Moreover, the flow utility (in consumption-equivalent units) of infected
and recovered individuals are typically (weakly) lower than that of susceptible individuals. We assume here
that the duration of the epidemic is small enough, so that the implied cost of death from existing estimates
of the statistical value of life remains a good approximation of the extra cost of death in our model. Note,
however, that we will also perform sensitivity analysis using lower as well as higher values for the cost of
death within the range [10, 208] implied by the range of statistical values of life [30, 225] and an annual
discount rate 5%.
29 A time series was obtained from the John Hopkins University Centre for Systems Science and Engi-
neering COVID-19 GitHub repository. Available: at https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
Following Lourenço et al. (2020), we trimmed the data to the first fourteen days of death counts above
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Given the integer nature of our data, matching all data points is futile especially
when there is a significant jump in values (in proportionate terms). To deal with this,
we weight the residuals (in proportional terms) between our model-generated counts
of cumulative deaths and the actual data by using the following procedure. First, we
attempt to calibrate the model by assigning weight one on each residual. This typically
produces results with large residuals for the fifth and eighth data points. The reason
is that both data points are associated with an increase in the number of cumulative
deaths which is more than 200%, something that the model cannot match. In fact, in
attempting to reduce these large residuals, the model was not fitting well the other
moments as well. Motivated by this, in the second step we assign weight zero on the
two largest residuals. Calibration with this weight profile typically produces larger
residuals for the two ”ignored” data points than the uniform weight rule but much
better approximation of the other data points.
5.1 The equilibrium SIR case
The remaining to be calibrated parameters are ρ, θ0, k, p, φL , φH , KL,0, KH ,0 and
I0. We find ρ = 0.1828, θ0 = 0.1974, k = 1091332, p = 0.4333, I0 = 38/N , φL =
−0.0025, φH = −2.9925, KL,0 = 5.58, KH ,0 = 14513. Observe that 0 < ρ < 1,
and so the data on UK deaths suggest that the postulated heterogeneity is empirically
plausible. In the next subsection, we discuss the benchmark case of no heterogeneity
to determine the bias from calibrating such a model by using data that is generated by
a heterogenous population.
Figure 2 shows reported and model generated counts of cumulative deaths (log10
transformed). Ignoring the residuals for the two dateswhen the proportional increase in
deaths was more than 200%, we have that the absolute residuals in proportional terms
are below 6.2% for the first four and last six dates. For the remaining two dates we
have that the model predicts only one count of cumulative deaths more than the actual
death toll of nine deaths on 12/03/2020, and predicts only one count of cumulative
deaths less than the actual death toll of seven on 11/03/2020.
This model predicts a very high death toll of 1, 406, 630 deaths in the absence of
a government intervention. It also predicts that by the end of the epidemic 60.9% of
the UK population would have been exposed to the virus, and that infections reach
their peak of 7.58% of the UK population by the 19th of April. Moreover, this model
predicts that by the date of the first reported death 0.009% would have already been
infected with the virus. This last number is noticeably lower than the prediction of
0.08% in Lourenço et al. (2020). Interestingly, our model also predicts that in the
absence of intervention the current epidemic wave in the UK would last for around
six months and a mean case fatality rate of around 7.84% over the duration of the
epidemic.
Footnote 29 continued
zero until 19/03/2020 (06/03/2020 to 19/03/2020) to include only the initial increase free of effects from
local control measures to avoid contamination by mitigation strategies that were implemented after that
time. The data was accessed on 04/04/2020 the first time. UK data was updated on 31/04/2020 and was
accessed on 01/05/2020. This version of the paper uses the updated data.
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Fig. 2 The model fit. The dash line shows the actual data, while the solid line depicts the model data
The equilibrium model generates also endogenous social distancing on the part of
susceptible individuals. In the calibrated model, the endogenous mean contact rate,
when averaged over the duration of the epidemic, is 0.8138. In the next subsection, we
discuss the benchmark case of exogenous and constant contact rate to determine the
bias from calibrating such a model by using data that is generated under endogenous
social distancing.
As Fig. 3 shows, high-risk individuals exercise maximal social distancing around
the infection peak, and certainly before the announcement of the UK lockdown on the
evening of the 23rd of March. High-risk individuals exercise a much stricter social
distancing than low-risk individuals, reaching maximal social distancing before the
infection peaks and maintaining it after the infection peaks. Social distancing of low-
risk individuals is increasing with the level of infection, reaches a peak and then
decreases with the level of infection. The mean contact rate has a U-shape for most
part of the epidemic emphasising further the importance of incorporating endogenous
social distancing in the SIR model (which assumes that the mean contact rate is
constant throughout the epidemic).30
Figure 4 contrasts social distancing by the various risk types against one of its
determinants; namely, the level of infections. Interestingly, the peak of low-risk indi-
viduals’ social distancing is after the peak of infection. To understand this, note that,
as we have already mentioned when discussing the equilibrium, social distancing is
30 The calibration results are very similar when we assume that the mortality rate is given by the logistic
function F(w) = p
1+e−k(w−x) : x = 9.4/10
8, k = 1.1976×107, ρ = 0.1527, p = 0.5239 and I0 = 37/N ,
and φL = −0.0028, φH = −2.9175, KL,0 = 6.4035, KH ,0 = 14171. Moreover, the peak date is on the
17th of April, the peak level of infection is 7.35%, the proportion in the population of infected by the date
the first death was reported is 0.009%, the duration of the epidemic is about 6 months, the level of exposure
at the end of the epidemic is 60.62%, and the total number of deaths is around 1.4M . Finally, the mean case
fatality rate is around 7.93% over the duration of the epidemic, and the mean contact rate, when averaged
over the duration of the epidemic, is 0.8208.
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Fig. 3 Equilibrium social distancing and the mean contact rate. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 18
February, 6 March and 19 March. The horizontal dash line indicates the maximal level of social distancing.
The plain solid line depicts themean contact rate, while the circle line shows the social distancing of low-risk
individuals and the cross line the social distancing of high-risk people
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Fig. 4 Equilibrium social distancing against infections. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 18 Febru-
ary, 6 March and 19 March. The plain solid line depicts infections as a percentage of the UK population,




(weakly) increasing with the level of infection while keeping constant the expected
NPV of the welfare cost from getting infected. Moreover, social distancing is increas-
ing with the expected NPV of the welfare cost from getting infected while keeping
constant the level of infection. However, the expected NPV of the welfare cost from
getting infected and the level of infection may not move in sync during the epidemic.
To see why this is the case, recall (13). Using the envelope theorem, we can see that
an increase in infections leads to an increase in the cost from getting infected in the
next instance. Observe, however, that how this cost evolves over time depends also
on its current value and the flow utilities from being in the Infected and Recovered
states, as captured by the term φL + ξKL . This term can be positive for high levels of
KL . In fact, Fig. 4 highlights that in the calibrated model this is indeed the case at the
infection peak, making low-risk individuals’ social distancing being increasing on the
date of the infection peak and for some time after.
Next, we check how the predictions about the epidemic and social distancing (cap-
tured by the equilibrium mean contact rate) change when we consider alternative
values for K ,R0 (equivalently, β), σ and ψ . For all the reported alternative values,
the duration of the current UK epidemic would have been around 6 months in the
absence of government intervention. Moreover, the mean fatality rate is around 0.795.
Different times from the onset of infection to death – for instance, ψ = 15, 20 – lead
to similar predictions for the fraction in the population of high-risk individuals, the
peak level of infection, the death toll and total exposure to the virus as well as the
initial level of infection and the number of cases when the first death was reported.
The only difference is in the peak date, with ψ = 15 predicting 22nd of April, and
ψ = 20 predicting 16th of April.31 Table 2 reports the findings for alternative values
for K ,R0 and σ (parameters that are not stated in the heading of a column stay the
same as in the basic calibration).
We note the reduction in the infection peak, the total exposure at the end of the
epidemic and the death toll as the transition rate from the Infectious to Recovered
state increases. The reason is that faced with a lower duration of the infection and
thereby lower infectiousness of the virus (recall that R0 decreases as σ increases),
low-risk individuals respond with lower social distancing. The latter, in turn, makes
the high-risk individuals to increase significantly their social distancing (at the early
stages of the epidemic), which leads to an increase in the mean contact rate when
averaged over time.
Observe next that as the economic cost of death increases, the death toll, total
exposure, the infectionpeak and themeancontact rate,when averagedover the duration
of the epidemic, have a U-shape. The reason behind these non-monotonicities is that
as the economic cost of death increases high-risk individuals take relatively more
precautions at the early stages of the infection, which, in turn, reduces (at the next unit
of time) the risk of infection and thereby the willingness of low-risk individuals to
exercise social distancing. The relative strength of these two opposite effects on social
distancing influences the net impact of a variation in the economic cost of death on
the various dimensions of the epidemic. In fact, as the reported results indicate, the
net impact depends on the level of the economic cost of death.
31 Details are available upon request.
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Note finally that an increase in the basic reproduction number implies a higher
transmission rate but, also, higher social distancing as an increase in infectiousness
leads to a higher probability of getting infected. The net result on the various dimen-
sions of the epidemic will depend on the relative strength of these two effects. The
reported results in Table 2 suggest that the death toll, the infection peak, total expo-
sure and mean contact rate, when averaged over the duration of the epidemic, have a
U-shape as the basic reproduction number increases.32
5.2 Comparison with some benchmark cases
5.2.1 Exogenous social distancing
Westartwith the case of the epidemiological version of the SIRwhere social distancing
is treated as exogenous and constant. In this benchmark case, we define the exogenous
mean contact rate to be γ = 1−δ. This benchmark model is, in effect, a generalisation
of themodel in Lourenço et al. (2020), who assume that themortality rate is exogenous
and that there is zero social distancing by every individual. Here, however, we allow for
δ to be positive. In effect, under the assumption that all individuals exert the same level
of social distancing, the proportion in the population of the high-risk individuals in
Lourenço et al. (2020) is equal (in terms of our notation) to ρ(1−δ). Importantly, here,
δ is also calibrated from the data together with the rest of the model parameters.33 We
find δ = 0.0913, ρ = 0.142, θ0 = 0.09, k = 636016, p = 0.5632 and I0 = 78/N .
Interestingly, ρ(1 − δ) = 0.129, which is significantly higher than the proportion in
the population of the high-risk individuals found in Lourenço et al. (2020) under the
assumption of exogenous mortality rate. Observe also that the mean contact rate in
this benchmark model, 1−δ, is higher by about 10% than the mean contact rate, when
averaged over the duration of the epidemic, under endogenous social distancing.
As our model, this benchmark model predicts that the current epidemic wave in the
UK would last for around six months in the absence of intervention. However, it also
predicts a total number of deaths of about 4, 33M and infections reaching their peak
of 16.11% of the UK population by 17th of April. It also predicts that by the end of
the epidemic 80.86% of the UK population would have been exposed to the virus. Our
model with endogenous social distancing predicts one third less, about half less, two
days later, and one quarter less of these findings, respectively. Thus, the model version
with constant mean contact rate significantly over-predicts the death toll, exposure and
the infection peak. Moreover, this benchmark model predicts a mean case fatality rate
of 6.78% which is about one percent below the one predicted by the calibrated model
with endogenous social distancing. In addition, this benchmark model predicts that
by the date of the first reported death 0.011% would have already been infected with
the virus. The latter is around 86% lower than the number found in Lourenço et al.
32 For completeness, we also note here that the calibrated fraction in the population of the high-risk
individuals, starting from the left column, is 0.275, 0.302, 0.063, 0.109, 0.123, 0.108.
33 Ignoring the residuals for the two dates when the proportional increase in deaths was more than 200%,
we have that the absolute residuals in proportional terms are below 5% for the first four, the sixth and the
last three dates. For the remaining four dates the residuals in proportionate terms are below 14%.
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(2020), and 22% higher than the number we found above under endogenous social
distancing.
5.2.2 No heterogeneity in mortality rates
In this section we want to compare our main calibration results with those under the
alternative assumption that there is no heterogeneity in mortality rates. We should
emphasise here that, as we have seen above, the calibrated value of ρ when we allow it
to take any value between zero and one is indeed positive but less than one justifying
our focus on heterogeneity in terms of underlying health conditions and how they may
lead to a death from infection.
Given that in the data there are deaths, to give the best chance to the benchmark
model with no heterogeneity, we assume that in this model all individuals face a risk
of developing a serious disease from infection and die afterψ periods, i.e. ρ = 1. This
benchmark model is, in effect, a generalisation of Toxvaerd (2020) allowing also for
(endogenous) mortality.34
We find θ0 = 0.0336, k = 98139, p = 0.8 and I0 = 38/N . This benchmark model
predicts amean case fatality rate of 7.88%which is very similar to the one predicted by
the calibrated model with heterogeneity. However, this benchmark model massively
under-predicts, compared to the model with heterogeneity, the death toll, the infection
peak and total exposure in the absence of a government intervention, predicting a total
number of deaths of about 12,000, that infections reach their peak of 0.0075% of the
UK population by 14th of May, and that by the end of the epidemic only 0.25% of
the UK population would have been exposed to the virus. In addition, this benchmark
model predicts that by the date of the first reported death 0.0065%would have already
been infected with the virus. The latter is around 28% lower than the number we found
earlier under heterogeneity. Finally, in this model, the endogenous mean contact rate,
when averaged over the duration of the epidemic, is 0.5056which is around 38% lower
than the corresponding mean contact rate under heterogeneity. The reason for these
discrepancies is that in an homogenous population where everyone is at risk of dying
from infection, everyone exercises a high degree of social distancing. Interestingly,
however, no one exercises the maximal degree of social distancing. The reason is
that when everyone else is expected to exercise high social distancing the chances of
getting infected are low and so it is not optimal to exercise maximal social distancing.
Table 3 summarises the comparison between our model and the two benchmark
models discussed above.
5.3 Partial lockdowns in the equilibrium SIRmodel
In what follows, we examine the effects on the main predictions of our model of
various scenarios of government intervention regarding social distancing. To fix ideas,
we assume that the controlling measures are implemented on the 24th of March, i.e.
the first day of the UK lockdown as announced by the UK government at 8pm of
34 In Toxvaerd (2020) there is no mortality. To compare our model with the one there we would have to
set ρ = 0, which would however predict zero deaths throughout the epidemic.
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Table 3 Comparison of models
Our model Exog. social distancing No heterogeneity (ρ = 1)
Mean contact rate (avg) 0.8138 0.9087 0.5056
Infection peak 7.58% 16.11% 0.0075%
Peak date 19 April 17 April 14 May
Death toll 1.4M 4.33M 12,000
Exposure 60.9% 80.86% 0.25%
Infections by 6 March 0.009% 0.011% 0.0065%
the 23rd of March, and are lifted on a specific date at least 5 weeks after the 24th of
March. We examine the case where both dates were not known on the introduction
date. We also assume that, on the date the lockdown was announced, the lockdown
was unanticipated, whereas the date the lockdown is lifted was anticipated.35
First, we run the case where the government enforces a minimal level of social
distancing whereby all individuals cut at least 40% of their contacts until the 30th
of April (inclusive). Under such regime, low-risk susceptible individuals are forced
to choose δ∗L = 0.4 throughout the intervention period, while the behaviour of high-
risk susceptible individuals is largely unaffected.36 All infectious individuals are also
forced to cut 40% of their contacts. In this scenario, the mean contact rate is, with
some abuse of notation, equal to γ (1 − 0.4). Figure 5 shows the social distancing
of susceptible individuals depending on their risk type under this partial lockdown
policy. Similar patterns of social distancing are found for longer periods of such social
distancing restrictions.
We find that under such an intervention the death toll is reduced by around 10,000,
about 0.8% reduction compared to the death toll under no intervention. We also find
that under such an intervention 60.71%of theUKpopulationwould have been exposed
to the virus by the end of the epidemic, which is lower only by 0.19% than the total
exposure by the end of the epidemic without intervention. Finally, infections would
have reached their peak of 7.33% by the 6th of June, which are lower by 0.25% and
almost a month and a half later, respectively, compared to the no intervention case.
Enforcing minimal level of social distancing at δ = 0.5 would have a larger impact.
Namely, compared to the case of no intervention, the death toll would have been
reduced by about 1.07%, the total exposure would have been lower by 0.32%, while
the infection peak would have been lower by around 0.2% and reached by around two
months later.
35 In reality, the situation is somewhere between with individuals having (some) imperfect information
on either of the two dates. We leave it for future work to appropriately modify our model to incorporate
imperfect information on the part of individuals regarding government intervention on social distancing.
36 The highest degree of social distancing low-risk susceptible individuals would choose in the absence
of government intervention would be 0.336. We have also run the case when the government enforces a
minimal level of social distancing whereby individuals cut at least 34% of their contacts until the 30th of
April (inclusive). Under such regime, infectious and low-risk susceptible individuals are forced to choose
δ∗L = 0.34 throughout the intervention period. We find that such an intervention would only have a small
effect in the infection peak, level of exposure and death toll. It would also delay the infection peak by a
month.
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Fig. 5 Equilibrium social distancing under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 April. The vertical
dash lines indicate the dates 24 March and 30 April. The circle line shows the social distancing of low-risk
individuals and the cross line the social distancing of high-risk people
Extending the lockdown of non-essential sectors and thereby the minimal level
of social distancing after the 30th of April would increase the impact of this type
of lockdown policies. For instance, keeping the minimal level of social distancing
at δ = 0.4 until the 30th of May (inclusive) would have as an effect that the death
toll would have been reduced by about 1.2%, the total exposure would have been
lower by around 0.35%, and the infection peak would have been lower by 0.29%
and reached by about three months later compared to the case of no intervention. All
aforementioned interventions reduce the mean contact rate, when averaged over time,
by around half. Figures 6, 7 and 8 contrast the infections, exposure and the death toll
under no intervention, and under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until the 30th of
April and until the 30th ofMay. Figures 5 and 6 together highlight the impact the social
distancing decisions of the low-risk susceptible individuals have on the evolution of
the epidemic: as soon as the lockdown measures in question are lifted there is an
after-wave due to low-risk susceptible individuals increasing drastically the frequency
of their interactions.
In our model individuals are assigned utilities and therefore we can measure the
welfare impact of the interventions in question. Assuming that the flow utilities of
the high- and low-risk susceptible individuals and the flow utilities of the high- and
low-risk recovered individuals coincide, we find that forcing all individuals to reduce
their contact rate to 0.4 until the 30th of April would yield an increase in the current
value of total lifetime utility from the time of the intervention onwards equal to 0.6%
of the corresponding current value of total lifetime utility under no intervention. The
corresponding welfare gains from forcing all individuals to reduce their contact rate
to 0.4 until the 30th of May and by 0.5 until the 30th of April are equal to 1.11%
and 0.83%, respectively. Interestingly, these findings suggest that milder but longer
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Fig. 6 Infections (as a percentage of theUKpopulation) under no intervention andminimal social distancing
of δ = 0.4 until 30 April or 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March, 30 April and 30
May. The plain solid line depicts infections in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line shows
infections under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 April and the cross line infections under
minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 May
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Fig. 7 Exposure (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention andminimal social distancing
of δ = 0.4 until 30 April or 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March, 30 April and 30
May. The plain solid line depicts infections in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line shows
infections under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 April and the cross line infections under
minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 May
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Fig. 8 Cumulative deaths (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention and minimal social
distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 April or 30May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24March, 30 April
and 30 May. The plain solid line depicts infections in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line
shows infections under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 April and the cross line infections
under minimal social distancing of δ = 0.4 until 30 May
Table 4 Impact of increasing minimal degree of social distancing δ
No interv. δ = 0.4 til 30 April δ = 0.4 til 30 May δ = 0.5 til 30 April
Mean contact rate (avg.) 0.8138 0.4588 0.4436 0.3755
Infection peak 7.58% 7.33% 7.29% 7.38%
Peak date 19 April 6 June 14 July 14 June
Death toll 1.4M 1.39M 1.39M 1.39M
Total exposure 60.9% 60.71% 60.55% 60.58%
Welfare gain – 0.6% 1.11% 0.83%
interventions of this type might be better in terms of total welfare. The impact of
increasing the minimal degree of social distancing δ is summarised in Table 4.
Next, we derive the epidemic under several alternatives values for themaximal level
of social distancing, δ = 0.70, 0.71, 0.72, . . . , 0.99, 1 until the 30th of April (inclu-
sive). This type of intervention does not affect the behaviour of infectious individuals.
Under all these cases the behaviour of the low-risk susceptible individuals remains
largely unchanged.37 Since they are the vast majority of susceptible individuals in the
calibrated economy, it thus should not be a surprise that we find that such intervention
37 To be precise their social distancing increases somewhat once the intervention stops because the risk of
getting infected is somewhat lower at that point due to the high-risk individuals having being more cautious
during the intervention period.
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has a very small impact on the pools of infectious and susceptible individuals.38 A
consequence of this is that in the calibrated economy there is no after-wave when
these lockdown policies are lifted, simply because the endogenous mean contact rate
is small enough so that the effective reproduction number is less than one when these
lockdown policies are lifted.
However, such an intervention enables the high-risk susceptible individuals to
increase their social distancing during the intervention period up to the new maxi-
mal level; Fig. 9 depicts social distancing by susceptible individuals when δ = 0.8.
Therefore, such an intervention has a significant impact on the death toll of the current
UK epidemic. When the maximal social distancing increases to δ = 0.8 until the 30th
of April, the death toll is reduced by around 300,000 ( 21%) compared to the case of no
government intervention. As another case, consider when maximal social distancing
increases to δ = 0.9 until the 30th of April. In this case, the death toll is reduced by
around 600,000 (43%) compared to the case of no government intervention.
Furthermore, interventions of this type that last between 5 and 8 weeks have very
similar effects on the pools of infectious and susceptible individuals. The reason here
is that high-risk susceptible individuals already exercise the maximal degree of social
distancing before the start of the lockdown period and maintain maximal social dis-
tancing well beyond the end of an 8-week lockdown period. However, interventions
that last between 5 and 8 weeks do differ in terms of the size of the negative effect they
have on the death toll. For instance, increasing maximal social distancing to δ = 0.8
until the 30th of May would reduce the death toll by 430,000 (around 30.7%) com-
pared to the case of no government intervention. All aforementioned interventions
lead to very similar mean contact rates, when averaged over time. Figure 10 depicts
the death toll when the maximal social distancing increases to δ = 0.8 until the 30th
of April and until the 30th of May.
Assuming that the flowutilities of the high- and low-risk susceptible individuals and
the flow utilities of the high- and low-risk recovered individuals coincide, we find that
allowing high-risk individuals to reduce their contact rate to 0.8 until the 30th of April
would yield an increase in the current value of total lifetime utility from the time of the
intervention onwards equal to 16% of the corresponding current value of total lifetime
utility under no intervention. The correspondingwelfare gains from allowing high-risk
individuals to reduce their contact rate to 0.8 until the 30th of May and to 0.9 until
the 30th of April are equal to 26% and 31%, respectively. Interestingly, these findings
suggest that allowing for stricter restrictions on essential activities but for a shorter
period might be better in terms of welfare gains. This is in contrast to what the results
in Table 4 indicate regarding the welfare effects of restricting less essential activities.
The impact of increasing the maximal degree of social distancing δ is summarised in
Table 5. Comparing the welfare effects in Tables 4 and 5 we also observe that allowing
the operation of only 20% the more essential sectors (i.e. increasing maximal social
distancing from 0.7 to 0.8) can generate much larger welfare gains than shutting down
38 For instance, for the cases of δ = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 until the 30th of April, the peak infection is
7.59%, 7.23%, 6.87%, respectively, the dates of the peak are 19th, 20th and 21st of April, respectively, and
the proportion in the populationof the exposed individuals at the endof the epidemic is 61%, 60.8%, 60.62%,
respectively.
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Fig. 9 Equilibrium social distancing under maximal social distancing of δ = 0.8 until 30 April. The vertical
dash lines indicate the dates 24 March and 30 April. The circle line shows the social distancing of low-risk
individuals, while the cross line shows the social distancing of high-risk people
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Fig. 10 Death toll (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention and maximal social
distancing of δ = 0.8 until 30 April and until 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March,
30 April or 30 May. The plain solid line depicts deaths in the absence of any intervention, while the circle
line shows deaths under maximal social distancing of δ = 0.8 until 30 April and the cross line deaths under
maximal social distancing of δ = 0.7 until 30 May
40% of the less essential sectors (i.e. increasing minimal social distancing from 0 to
0.4).
Our model can match observed numbers of death to a good degree with the appro-
priate choice of minimal and maximal social distancing. At the time of writing these
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Table 5 Impact of increasing maximal degree of social distancing δ
No interv. δ = 0.8 til 30 April δ = 0.8 til 30 May δ = 0.9 til 30 April
Mean contact rate (avg.) 0.8138 0.8213 0.8307 0.8182
Infection peak 7.58% 7.23% 7.19% 6.87%
Peak date 19 April 20 April 20 April 21 April
Death toll 1.4M 1.1M 0.97M 0.81M
Exposure 60.9% 60.8% 60.18% 60.62%
Welfare gain – 16% 26% 31%
lines (7 May 2020) the number of deaths in UK was between 32,000 and 33,000,
with the UK (partial) lockdown still being in place, and talks in the news about lifting
some of the lockdownmeasures start appearing in mainstream newspapers.39 We have
checked some indicative levels of δ and δ in an attempt to approximate the aforemen-
tioned death toll. It turns out that setting δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 between 24 March
and 30 May produces a death toll on the 7th of May between 32,000 and 33,000.
Therefore, our model could predict the observed data to a good degree.40 With such
lockdown policies, infectious individuals cut down their contacts by 31.5%.Moreover,
the pattern of social distancing by susceptible individuals is similar to the one depicted
in Fig. 5 because the low-risk individuals are a significant majority of susceptible peo-
ple in the calibrated population. Such an intervention leads to a mean contact rate,
when averaged over time, of 0.5171, and yields an increase in the current value of
total lifetime utility from the time of the intervention onwards equal to 1.23% of the
corresponding current value of total lifetime utility under no intervention. Figures 11,
12 and 13 depict the evolution of infections, total exposure and death toll under the
lockdown policy that enforces δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30th of May, contrasting
them with their counterparts under no intervention.
6 Conclusions
Motivated by the current coronavirus epidemic, we have analysed a SIR model of an
epidemic but with endogenous social distancing. We have calibrated the model to UK
data on reported deaths prior to the introduction of the UK lockdown to study various
hypothetical scenarios of government intervention regarding social distancing. We
have explicitly taken into account that there is heterogeneity among the population
in terms of infection-induced fatality rates and thereby private decisions on social
distancing. We have also postulated that, due to limited resources available for health
services, mortality rates may depend on the stock of infected people who become
seriously ill because of the infection.
39 See, for instance, the following article in the Independent: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/coronavirus-uk-lockdown-measures-lift-announcement-boris-johnson-news-a9501441.html.
40 Increasing the maximal degree of social distancing over 75%would enable matching the observed death
toll by using a lower minimal degree of social distancing than 31.5%.
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Fig. 11 Infections (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention and combined intervention
of δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March and 30
May. The plain solid line depicts infection in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line shows
infections under the combined intervention of δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May










Exposed as proportion of UK population 
24 Mar 30 May
No intervention
Combined intervention until 30 May
Fig. 12 Exposure (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention and combined intervention
of δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March and 30 May.
The plain solid line depicts exposure in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line shows exposure
under the combined intervention of δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May
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24 Mar 30 May
No intervention
Combined intervention until 30 May
Fig. 13 Deaths (as a percentage of the UK population) under no intervention and combined intervention of
δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May. The vertical dash lines indicate the dates 24 March and 30 May. The
plain solid line depicts deaths in the absence of any intervention, while the circle line shows deaths under
the combined intervention of δ = 0.315 and δ = 0.75 until 30 May
We show that the predicted evolution of the epidemic is significantly different
when social distancing is endogenous than when the mean contact rate is assumed
to be exogenous and constant. For instance, the death toll and total exposure in the
calibrated model with endogenous social distancing is one third of and one quarter
less than that under exogenous social distancing. Moreover, the mean contact rate,
when averaged over the duration of the epidemic, is lower by about 10% than under
exogenous and constant social distancing. Furthermore, under endogenous social dis-
tancing, the predicted infection peak as a proportion of the UK population is lower
by 9%. Our model predicts that by the date of the first reported death around 0.009%
of the UK population would have already been infected with the virus, and that the
current epidemic wave in the UK would last around six months in the absence of
government intervention. Our numerical analysis also suggests that the peak of the
mortality rate in UK would have occurred mid April in the absence of government
intervention, but with a significant death toll by the end of the epidemic.
Regarding the effects of various scenarios of government intervention on social dis-
tancing, our results suggest that the length of a lockdown that restricts the less essential
activities has a significant effect on the death toll, and the “flattening of the curve”,
but also on the behavioural responses of low-risk individuals. These responses may
lead to an after-wave. Furthermore, our numerical analysis indicates that a govern-
ment intervention that restricts the more essential activities has a significant negative
impact on the cumulative count of deaths, but not on the behavioural responses of
low-risk individuals and the evolution of infections and herd immunity. The latter
implies that such a government intervention might not be followed by an after-wave
once restrictions are lifted.
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Restrictions on social distancing can generate welfare gains compared to the case
of no intervention. Milder but longer restrictions on less essential activities might
be better in terms of welfare gains than stricter but shorter restrictions, whereas the
oppositemight be the case for restrictions onmore essential activities. Finally, shutting
down 10%more of the essential sectors might generate much larger welfare gains than
shutting down 40% of the less essential sectors.
Our approach could also be used for the study of the Covid-19 epidemic in other
countries where there is reliable data on deaths. The methodology in this paper could
also be extended for the study of other epidemics by modifying the underlying epi-
demiological model appropriately.
An interesting extension of the epidemiological side of our model would be to
allow for a period when infected individuals can be infectious but asymptomatic as
well as for an incubation period during which infected people are asymptomatic and
non-infectious, as these changes are expected to have an impact on social distancing
decisions and thereby the evolution of the epidemic. Another interesting extension of
our model would be to introduce heterogeneity in the time of delay from the onset
of the infection to death as well as in the recovery rate from being infectious to not
contributing to the spread of the infection.
In reality, individuals may not be certain about the fundamental epidemiological
parameters such as the recovery and the transmission rate, or about the level of infec-
tions. In all these cases, decision-making would be taking place under uncertainty
about the risks of social distancing. In such an environment, high-risk susceptible
individuals might exercise a lower degree of social distancing. Loss-aversion could
also make even low-risk susceptible individuals to exercise a significant degree of
social distancing. Similar behavioural changes could also be observed in a model
where people do not know their risk type but the population consists of two groups
with different beliefs on the likelihood that they are of high or low risk. These are all
interesting extensions of the economic side of our model.
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7 Appendix
7.1 The SIR with heterogeneity in infection-inducedmortality rates
Let ni , i = L, H , be the probability a susceptible individual of risk-type i (L for low,
H for high) comes in contact with an infectious person. Let I i be the proportion in
the population of infectious individuals of risk-type i who will not die. Let Si be the
proportion in the population of susceptible individuals of risk-type i . Let Ri be the
proportion in the population of exposed and non-infectious individuals of risk-type i
who will not die. Let I be the proportion in the population of infectious individuals
of high risk who will die (in ψ periods). Let R be the proportion in the population
of exposed individuals of high risk who will die (in ψ periods) but are non-infectious
due to hospitalisation.
There is the standard infection flow from SL to I L at rate nLβ I and from SH to I H
at rate (1 − θ)nHβ I . These rates differ from the standard ones to accommodate for
the respective contact probabilities ni , i = L, H , and that only a fraction of high-risk
individuals survive the infection. There are also the standard flows from I L to RL and
from I H to RH , at rate σ , of recovered individuals. In our model, however, there are
additional flows. There is a flow from SH to I of the share of the population that is
of high risk, becomes infectious and will die (in ψ periods), at a rate θnHβ I . There
is also a flow from I to R at a rate σ ; this is the share of the population that is of
high risk, will die (in ψ periods) and become non-infectious due to hospitalisation.
The epidemic is then described by the following laws-of-motion:
d I L
dt
= nLβSL I − σ I L (15)
d I H
dt
= (1 − θ)nHβSH I − σ I H (16)
dI
dt






= −nLβSL I (19)
dSH
dt
= −nHβSH I (20)
dRL
dt
= σ I L (21)
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dRH
dt
= σ I H (22)
with initial values I L(t0) = (1 − ρ)I0, I H (t0) = (1 − θ)ρ I0, I (t0) = θρ I0,
R(t0) = 0, SL(t0) = (1 − ρ)S0, SH (t0) = ρS0, RL(t0) = RH (t0) = 0.
Let now γ = nL(1−ρ)+nHρ, I = I L+ I H+I , I L = (1−ρ)I , I H = ρ(1−θ)I ,
SL = (1− ρ)S, SH = ρS RL = (1− ρ)R, RH = ρ(1− θ)R, R = RL + RH + R ,
and  = I + R and Z = I + R = 1 − S. I is the proportion in the population of
infectious individuals of any type, which includes those who will die (afterψ periods)
and are not hospitalised and hence are still infectious, I . S is the proportion in the
population of susceptible people of any risk type. R is the proportion in the population
of non-infectious individuals of any risk type, which includes those who will die
(after ψ periods) and are hospitalised and so are non-infectious, R . Finally, Z is the
proportion in the population of the exposed individuals whether they are infectious




= γβSI − σ I (23)
dS
dt





= σ I (25)
with initial values I (t0) = I0 ∈ (0, 1), S(t0) = S0 = 1 − I0 = 1 − Z(t0) ∈ (0, 1)





with ψ(t0) = θρ I0.
7.2 NPVs of being at the susceptible and infectious states
Let the flow utility from being infectious and of low risk be vLI , the flow utility from
being infectious and of high risk be vHI , the flow utility from being non-exposed and
of low risk be vLS , the flow utility from being non-exposed and of high risk be v
H
S , the
flow utility of being exposed and recovered and of low risk be vLR , and the flow utility
of being exposed and recovered and of high risk be vLR . Assume that
viS ≥ viR ≥ viI i = L, H
and
vLj ≥ vHj , j = S, R, I
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Given that Recovered is an absorbing state, we have that theNPVof being recovered




Consider next an interval [t, t + dt) with dt very small. We have that the NPV of
being infectious and of low risk at time t , V LI is equal to
V LI = vLI dt + [1 − σdt]e−ξdt V LI + σdte−ξdt V LR




24 + · · · + y
n
n! + · · · we have that
V LI (1 + ξdt) = vLI dt + (1 − σdt)V LI + σdtV LR + oL(dt)
where

















+ · · ·
}
Canceling terms, rearranging, dividing by dt , then taking the limit as dt → 0 and
using the above equation for VR, we derive that
V LI =








The NPV of being infectious at time t and of high risk but surviving the infection,
V HI , is equal to
V HI = vHI dt + [1 − σdt]e−ξdt V HI + σdte−ξdt V HR
Using similar steps to the ones above, we have that
V HI =








Finally, let VD be the NPV of being infected in period t ′, and of high risk and dying
in period t ′ + ψ . With a constant utility flow in the first ψ periods (which includes
any disutility due to the anticipation of death), VD is constant.
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7.3 Non-cooperative social distancing by susceptible individuals
Consider an interval [t, t + dt) and an individual of risk type i = L, H , who is
susceptible at instant t and chooses the probability ni , with which they get in contact
with each and every of the other individuals in the population, while taking as given
the mortality rate for high-risk individuals, F(ρ I ), the transmission rate, β, and the
stocks of infection I and susceptibility S.
Recall that nLβ I is the probability of a low-risk individual getting infected, and
that nHβ I is the probability of a high-risk individual getting infected. Recall also
that a high-risk individual becomes critically ill with probability F(ρ I ) after being
infected. Thus, F(ρ I )nHβ I is the transition rate from the state of being susceptible
and of high risk to the state of being critically ill and eventually dying. LetWL = V LI
andWH = [1− F(ρ I )]V HI + F(ρ I )VD be the expected NPVs of low- and high-risk
susceptible individuals, respectively, from being infected.
The best NPV that can be obtained at any time t from being susceptible and of
risk-type i given the level of infection I and susceptibility S, denoted by V iS(I , S), is
equal to







+ (1 − nβ I dt) e−ξdt V iS
(
I + d I
dt




+ nβ I dte−ξdtW i
}
Note that, with dt being very small, we have
V iS
(
I + d I
dt




= V iS (I , S) +











= V iS (I , S) +




βγ S − σ ] dt − ∂V
i
S (I , S)
∂S
βγ SI
Using similar steps to the ones above, we then have that





− nβ I V iS (I , S) + nβ IW i
+∂V
i




βγ S − σ ] − ∂V
i





where γ, I , S and Wi are taken as given.
Let δ = 1 − n. It follows that social distancing of risk-type i individuals given the




















denote the solution of the above maximisation problem. We then
have that the social distancing in equilibrium of risk-type i individuals given the states









































where the first condition is the necessary condition of the abovemaximisation problem




















= βγ SI ∂V
i




βγ S − σ ] − ∂V
i
S (I , S)
∂S
βγ SI
We can then derive the problem of susceptible individuals as stated in the main text
by setting:
CL ≡ KL = V LS − WL = V LS − V LI = V LS −





KH = V HS − V HI = V HS −






K = V HI − VD =




ξ + σ − VD
and so
CH ≡ KH + F (ρ I ) K = V HS − WH = V HS − V HI + F (ρ I )
[
V HI − VD
]
Note that K > 0 if VD is small enough, which is assumed to be the case. We also









that KL < KH .
Finally, note that social distancing by high-risk individuals depends on the mor-
tality rate, which depends on level of infection. After using the above definitions, the
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equilibrium social distancing distancing
(
δ∗L (KL , I ) , δ∗H (KH , I )
)
is given by:
δ∗L (KL , I ) = min{max{β I KL , δ}, δ}
δ∗H (KH , I ) = min{max{β I
[
KH + F (ρ I ) K
]
, δ}, δ}
where KL and KH evolve over time according to the following system of ODEs (given















δ∗L (KL , I )
)2
2
− [1 − δ∗L (KL , I )
]
β I V LI
= ξ
[
KL + V LI
]
+ [1 − δ∗L (KL , I )
]
β I KL − vLS +
(


















δ∗H (KH , I )
)2
2








KH + V HI
]




KH + F (ρ I ) K
] − vHS +
(
δ∗H (KH , I )
)2
2
The above ODEs become the laws-of-motion stated in the main text after setting
φi = ξV iI − viS, i = L, H . Note that φi ≤ 0.
For the calibrations, we set vLS = vHS = vS and normalise units by setting vS = 0.













− K < 0
Finally note that with logarithmic utility, and denoting with cij , i = L, H , j =
S, I , R, the state- and risk-type dependent consumption, we can define consumption-
equivalent units ci , i = L, H , and cD , and a proportionate payment stream p such




















) − log (cH (1 − p))
ξ
= log (1) − log (1 − p)
ξ
= −log (1 − p)
ξ
7.4 Optimal social distancing of susceptible individuals
Here we solve the problem of finding the optimal from the point of view of the
society social distancing of susceptible individuals from a period tg onwards, while
taking into account the implications for aggregate infections. Specifically, we find the
social distancing profile of susceptible individuals that maximises total welfare in the
economy. To ease exposition, we assume without loss of generality that infectious
individuals do not exercise any social distancing.
Recall that nLβ I is the probability of a low-risk individual getting infected, and
that nHβ I is the probability of a high-risk individual getting infected. Recall also
that a high-risk individual becomes critically ill with probability F(ρ I ) after being
infected. Thus, F(ρ I )nHβ I is the transition rate from the state of being susceptible
and of high risk to the state of being critically ill and eventually dying. Recall also
from the previous subsection in this appendix the definition that WL = V LI and
WH = [1 − F(ρ I )] V HI + F(ρ I )VD .
Let also VR = (1−ρ)V HR +ρV HR and VI = (1−ρ)V HI +ρV HI . Using the results
in the previous subsection in this appendix, we have that VR − VI ≥ 0 and that VR
and VI are constants. Let also γ (nL , nH ) = (1 − ρ)nL + ρnH . ,Given the constants
VR and VI and the levels of infection and susceptibility Iand S, define here with some
abuse of notation the NPV of susceptible people that is obtained by optimal social
distancing.
Given the levels of infection I and susceptibility S at instant t ≥ tg , the government
chooses the probabilities (nL , nH ), with which low-risk and high-risk susceptible
individuals, respectively, get in contact with each and every of the other individuals in
the population, while taking into account how these probabilities affect the mortality
rate for high-risk individuals, F(ρ I ), and the evolution of the population shares of
infectious and susceptible people. With some abuse of notation, let Ṽ iS(n
L , nH , S, I )
be the NPV of a susceptible individual of risk type i = L, H , given the levels of
infection I and susceptibility S, and the social distancing profile (nL , nH ) at instant




[1 − S − I ] VR + I VI + S
[
(1 − ρ)Ṽ LS (nL , nH , S, I ) + ρṼ HS (nL , nH , S, I )
]}




(1 − ρ)Ṽ LS (nL , nH , S, I ) + ρṼ HS (nL , nH , S, I )
}
Let V iS(I , S) be theNPV for a susceptible individual of risk type i = L, H , evaluated at
the optimum social distancing profile. Let VS(I , S) = (1−ρ)V LS (I , S)+ρV LS (I , S),
and note that VS(I , S) is the value function of the above maximisation problem.
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dt + nLβ I dte−ξdt V LI
+(1 − nLβ I dt)e−ξdt V LS
(
I + d I
dt







(1 − nH )2
2
]
dt + nHβ I dte−ξdt
[
V HI − F(ρ I )
[
V HI − VD
]]
+(1 − nHβ I dt)e−ξdt V HS (I +
d I
dt




given the laws-of-motion d Idt ,
dS
dt . Note that, with dt being very small, we have
V iS
(
I + d I
dt




= V iS(I , S) +











βγ (nL , nH )SIdt


























S (I , S)
∂S










V HI − V HS (I , S)
]
− F(ρ I )
[












S (I , S)
∂S
βγ (nL , nH )SI
}}
Clearly then, after letting δi = 1− ni , i = L, H , and recalling the definition of K























V HS (I , S) − V HI
]























S (I , S)
∂S
]}}
Therefore, compared to the problem solved by susceptible individuals, the govern-
ment internalises the externalities generated by the social distancing of each risk-type
through the impact of social distancing on the mean contact rate and thereby on the
mortality rate and the evolution of the epidemic.
7.4.1 Solving for the optimal social distancing
Let
DVS(I , S) ≡ (1 − ρ)
[













S (I , S)
∂S
]
The necessary conditions of the above maximisation problem are:
β I
[
V LS (I , S) − V LI
]




V HS (I , S) − V HI
]
+ F(βγ (nL , nH )SI )K
}
− δH = βSI DVS(I , S)
Note that individuals do not internalise the effect of their decisions on the evolution
of the epidemic either. An increase in current social distancing (of any given individ-
ual) reduces the new infections and thereby it reduces the future population share of
infectious people while it increases the future population share of the susceptible part
of the population. These changes have the following implications.
First, a decrease in the level of infection decreases the expected net present value
of the cost of infection. It also decreases the new infections, and thereby the future
level of infection and hence the future expected net present values of the cost of
infection, and so on. These effects push towards DVS(I , S) > 0. However, note also
that a decrease in the level of infection also decreases mortality rates and therefore
the expected cost from dying. This effect pushes towards DVS(I , S) < 0. Second,
an increase in the level of susceptibility increases the new infections and hence the
future level of infection and thereby the expected net present value of the cost of
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infection in the future. These effects push towards DVS(I , S) > 0. Therefore, the
overall welfare effect of changes in the evolution of the epidemic and thereby the
associated externality of social distancing, as captured by the term DVS(I , S), cannot
be signed without further restrictions on the primitives of the model.
We assume that K is high enough to ensure that the positive externality via the
effect of social distancing on the mortality rate (ψ periods ahead) dominates, i.e.
βSI DVS(I , S) < 0
and so the overall externality generated by social distancing is positive. It follows
directly (from the first two optimality conditions) that the optimal social distancing is
(weakly) higher than private choices,41 with optimal social distancing from high-risk
individuals being higher than that from low-risk individuals.
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